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Abstract 
 
A decade after the House of Lords declared the notion of an agreement to negotiate a contract in good faith 
to be ‘wholly unworkable in practice’ the Californian Appeals court affirmed the validity of just such a 
‘contract’, opening up the possibility of significant reliance damages arising out of future failed business 
ventures. The case of Copeland v Baskin-Robbins, USA has major implications for pre-closing negotiations 
in the State of California, and the US generally, but what, if anything, does it mean for the European 
Commission’s ongoing ‘Common Frame of Reference’ strategy aimed at removing problematic divergences 
and inconsistencies between European contract laws? Commercial bargaining, incomplete contracts and 
the spectre of precontractual reliance remain a significant, if largely neglected, challenge for emergent EC 
contract rules, yet does Copeland provide a lead on how best to police the formation of international 
commercial agreements or merely represent a further weakening of party autonomy for those seeking to 
drive the hardest bargain? In this paper the author explores the world of almost contract, the ‘contract’ to 
bargain in good faith and looks beyond the current resistance of the English common law to sketch the 
parameters of a new EC reliance doctrine.    
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1. Introduction*
 
Precontractual reliance and the protection of reasonable commercial expectation remains a 
significant, if largely neglected, challenge for emergent EC contract rules. In contrast to the US, 
where precontractual investment in negotiations and the efficacy of legal default rules has 
received sustained scholarly treatment, in Europe a modern clamour for codification has largely 
sidelined broader practical and doctrinal considerations surrounding the harmonisation debate. 
This misplaced fixation on codification has further downplayed the mechanics of commercial 
contracting in particular and overlooked the importance of contract drafting. Perhaps the most 
convincing argument in favour of the convergence thesis remains that in a legally and 
linguistically diverse Europe a common bedrock of agreed rules may gradually yield enhanced 
legal certainty and predictability for business actors. However, a lack of empirical enquiry has 
characterised the work of the European institutions to date in promoting the assumed need for 
new principles of general application. This quest for ‘coherence’ has further blurred the need for 
such enquiry and diverted attention from the real law in action. Whilst evidence of problematic 
divergences remains at best patchy, the case of Copeland v Baskin Robbins, USA1 does highlight 
one discrete difficulty that typically arises in commercial contracting even where parties share a 
common language and legal culture.2  
 
The decision of the Californian Court of Appeals in Copeland raises a number of pertinent 
questions for European legal practice, and particularly for those academics and practitioners 
currently preparing the European Commission’s ‘Common Frame of Reference’ on European 
contract law.3 The case is symptomatic of wider problems arising in international commerce 
through the use of letters of intent, memoranda of understanding and other non-binding, if 
persuasive documentation in the course of commercial deal-making and ought reasonably to be 
                                            
* Martin J. Doris, Barrister (England & Wales) and Lecturer in Private & Commercial Law, University of Glasgow, 
UK. 
 
1 96 Cal.App.4th 1251 (2002). 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875. The case has thus far failed to attract attention in mainstream 
European scholarship.  
 
2 For a particularly instructive analysis of legal harmonisation and its impact on both language and wider culture, 
see B. DE WITTE (2004). See also Proceedings of the PriME Conference on Private Law and the Many Cultures of 
Europe, Helsinki, August, 2006. Though commonly overlooked the language used in negotiations is evidently of 
major concern to commercial actors keen to gain an edge and may have a significant bearing on any agreed 
outcomes in cross-border trade. Whilst a raft of academic contributions analysing the harmonisation of European 
private laws have typically reinforced the importance of safeguarding national legal cultures and peculiarities, 
few have considered the impact of language on commercial drafting and negotiations generally. There are 
however glimmers of new thinking in relation to the critical importance of contract drafting, see F. GRIFFITH 
DAWSON & S. STYLLIS, (2007).  
 
3 Political sensitivity to the potential adverse impact on the internal market of diversity in Member States’ contract 
laws has prompted the European institutions to finance research on what has rather cryptically been termed a 
‘Common Frame of Reference’ (CFR). It is anticipated that the Common Frame will comprise general principles 
complete with commentary, model rules and/or definitions of abstract legal terminology. For a fuller picture of 
the European Commission’s ongoing ‘coherence’ initiative see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/index_en.htm. 
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concentrating the minds of those most directly involved in seeking to eradicate problematic 
divergences between national European contract laws. 
 
 
2. Just Banana Ripple or a European Banana Skin? 
 
The background to the Copeland dispute concerned the prolonged negotiation of a contingency 
agreement whereby the appellant, Mr. Kevin Copeland, had sought to purchase an ice-cream 
manufacturing plant direct from Baskin-Robbins that was under threat of closure. Copeland was 
content to acquire the plant from the ice-cream giant provided that the company in return agreed 
to purchase a yearly quantity of ice-cream direct from the appellant. It was made clear to Baskin-
Robbins from the outset that this ‘co-packing’ arrangement was critical to Copeland’s interest in 
the plant. Baskin-Robbins duly prepared a letter of intent setting out the initial terms of the 
bargain which Copeland later signed and returned with a non-refundable deposit. It was agreed 
that the plant would be purchased at a cost of $1.3 million in return for the supply of several 
million gallons of ice-cream over an initial three year period. So far, so good.4
 
Yet the parties continued to bargain. The ice-cream purchase price, product quality and control, 
the assumption of losses and other essentials remained on the table. After several months 
without agreement, Baskin-Robbins lost heart, broke off negotiations and returned the original 
deposit, stating that its parent company had: 
 
“recently . . . made strategic decisions around the Baskin-Robbins business [and that] the 
proposed co-packing arrangement [is] out of alignment with our strategy . . . [as such] we will 
not be engaging in any further negotiations of a co-packing arrangement”.  
 
As the Appeals court would later observe, regrettably for Copeland at this point ‘many millions 
of dollars in anticipated profits … melted away like so much banana ripple ice cream on a hot 
summer day’. At First Instance the sole trader received an unsympathetic judicial ear. It was held 
that no contract existed between the parties as there was merely an agreement to agree that was 
unenforceable. The Second District Court of Appeal would later uphold this finding, 
acknowledging that the letter of intent language used by the parties was not of itself a binding 
expression of the entire transaction. Yet despite dismissing the appeal outright on the grounds 
that Copeland had earlier disavowed any reliance-based claim for damages, the court did avail of 
the opportunity to consider the distinction between an ‘agreement to agree’ which is 
                                            
4 In May 1999, Copeland received a letter stating: “This letter details the terms which our Supply Chain executives 
have approved for subletting and sale of our Vernon manufacturing facility/equipment and a product supply 
agreement … (1) Baskin Robbins will sell Vernon's ice cream manufacturing equipment . . . for $ 1,300,000 cash … 
(2) Baskin Robbins would agree, subject to a separate co-packing agreement and negotiated pricing, to provide a 
three year co-packing agreement for 3,000,000 gallons in year 1, 2,000,000 gallons in year 2 and 2,000,000 in year 3 
… If the above is acceptable please acknowledge by returning a copy of this letter with a non-refundable check for 
three thousand dollars. . . . We should be able to coordinate a closing [within] thirty days thereafter”.  
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unenforceable and an ‘agreement to negotiate in good faith’ which could, in the eyes of the Court, 
‘be formed and breached like any other contract’.5  
 
The Court of Appeals was not unmoved by the rather unfortunate situation in which Copeland 
now found himself and stressed above all the need to protect parties whose investment of ‘time, 
money and effort’ should not be ‘wiped out by another party’s foot-dragging or change of heart’ 
or by their ‘taking advantage of a vulnerable position’.6 Relying extensively upon the highly 
influential academic opinion of Professor E.A. Farnsworth, the appellate court rejected the public 
policy arguments advanced by counsel for Baskin-Robbins7 and, interpreting his analysis, the 
Court suggested that Farnsworth’s criticisms of reliance-based claims were directed merely: 
 
“… at the theory propounded by some European courts and legal scholars that, even absent a 
contractual agreement to negotiate, a general obligation of fair dealing arises out of the 
negotiations themselves”.8  
 
The Court stressed that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would not apply 
throughout contract negotiations. Rather, in its view, such an implied covenant only arises if the 
parties have entered into an agreement to negotiate. To avoid an implied obligation of good faith 
and fair dealing, the letter of intent language used must therefore be carefully drafted, perhaps in 
such a manner as to expressly rule out any such commitment. Applying the Court’s reasoning 
Copeland would have been successful in his appeal had his legal team not overlooked a reliance-
based claim in his original pleading. Importantly, in seeking to protect the rights and 
entitlements of parties involved in negotiations, the Appellate Court argued that the doctrines of 
unjustified enrichment and promissory estoppel fail to provide a party with ‘an adequate vehicle 
for relief’ when its negotiating partner breaks off negotiations or bargains in bad faith. The Court 
reasoned that due to the length, complexity and expense of commercial negotiations, public 
policy favours safeguarding parties to a business negotiation from bad faith practices. The case 
                                            
5 The court was moved to consider previous US case-law distinguishing an ‘agreement to agree’ from an 
agreement to negotiate in good faith. The Appeal court cited the leading case of Channel Home Centers Home 
Centers Division of Grace Retail Corp. v. Grossman 795 F. 2d. 291 (3d Cir. 1986). Baskin Robbins made forceful 
argument that a decision to follow the Channel Home ruling would in effect inject a doctrine of good faith and fair 
dealing into all commercial negotiations by the back door; that it would have a chilling impact on such 
negotiations generally, and would threaten investment in negotiations where the chances of success were slim.  
 
6 A transcript of the Appeal Court’s judgment is currently available via 
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/california statecases/b1498. 
 
7 It is noteworthy that it was Baskin-Robbins, and not Copeland, that sought to rely on E.A. FARNSWORTH (1987). 
In his article Farnsworth identifies three possible grounds for imposing liability for another party’s reliance: 
under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, see Pancratz Co. v Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction and Development, 720 P.2d 
906; for negligent misrepresentation, see Restatement (2nd) Torts, §§525,530 and Markov v ABC Transfer & Storage 
Co. 457 P.2d 535 (Wash.1969) and on the grounds of promissory estoppel.  
 
8 As the court noted, such a general overriding duty of good faith and fair-dealing in negotiations under 
Californian law had previously been rejected by the Appeals Court in Los Angeles Equestrian Center, Inc. v. City of 
Los Angeles (1993) 17 Cal. App. 4th 432. A raft of other States, including the State of Massachusetts for instance, do 
not recognise an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in negotiations absent a binding agreement expressly 
committing the parties to such an arrangement, see inter alia, Lafayette Place Assocs. v Boston Redevelopment 
Authority, 427 Mass 509, 517 (1998), FDIC v LeBlanc, 85 F.3d 815 (1996).  
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does therefore provide substantial authority under Californian contract law that where a contract 
to negotiate exists, pre-closing negotiations must be conducted in accordance with good faith and 
fair dealing and that a failure to do so may result in a successful claim for reliance damages.9  
Importantly, to date the decision, far from generating widespread approval has instead been 
presented as a potential pitfall for business relying on Californian contract rules.10 Moreover, 
despite the distinction drawn, the analysis of the Court of Appeal would appear to fit relatively 
neatly with modern case law emanating from a number of European civil law jurisdictions. The 
decision may therefore be greeted most warmly by those civil lawyers promoting harmonisation 
and codification at Community level yet is unlikely to find favour with the commercial courts in 
England and Wales.11 At the risk of caricaturing the law, it is broadly accepted that whilst civil 
law jurisdictions have a clear tradition of finding and upholding broad precontractual duties in 
negotiations under the doctrine of good faith, the English common law of contracts has typically 
considered their imposition a real risk to legal certainty and a potential cause of increased 
negotiation and/or litigation costs in a commercial context. Such a flexible, laissez-faire 
approach, it is argued, encourages open and free negotiations whilst discouraging ‘self-seeking 
documents or utterances’.12  
 
Importantly, however, this self-serving approach to precontractual negotiations in subsequent 
litigation has been heavily frowned upon by courts in the US and European civil law jurisdictions 
for complicating and prolonging litigation. For instance, in a recent commercial case involving an 
alleged verbal promise to contract, the Provincial court of Girona found that both parties made 
self-seeking statements, with one party arguing that there was a binding promise to contract, the 
other that there was a mere non-binding letter of intent, yet upon a ‘simple reading’ of both the 
context and the letter of intent, the Court determined that a specific promise to contract had 
indeed been made, sufficient to bind the parties in accordance with the requirements of Article 
1.261 of the Spanish Civil code.13 What is apparent, however, in both US and European market 
settings is the weakness of the traditional rules on contract formation to do justice to modern 
business negotiations. This should come as no surprise given their emergence in the discrete 
contracting age of yesteryear. Nonetheless, the judicial starting point in seeking to regulate 
incomplete agreements invariably requires a search for sufficient evidence of assent. Isolating the 
exact moment of formation appears increasingly inefficient, and Schwartz and Scott attribute 
                                            
9 The Appellate Court was quite categoric that an award of reliance damages would be appropriate for breach of 
an agreement to negotiate. As the terms of the proposed contract were at no time fully agreed, lost expectation 
costs would be unquantifiable and therefore unrecoverable. The Court was of the opinion, however, that a party's 
“out-of-pocket” costs arising out of the failed negotiations and possibly lost opportunity costs, should be 
recoverable. 
 
10 See in particular, PERKINS COIE Update (2002) and I. RIVIN (2002).  
 
11 Under Dutch law, for example, a party who breaks off advanced negotiations is liable for expenses incurred by 
the other party, see W.J.P. WILS (1992),. See also E. HONDIUS, E. (1991). 
 
12 Per MacDuff J in Sykes v Pannell Kerr Foster, unreported QBD, 30 March 2001. 
 
13 See Sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Girona, 12.6.2004 (Secc. 2ª, AC 2004\1748). 
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much of the current legal ambiguity to the courts’ lack of familiarity with handling contract 
incompleteness.14  
 
What makes the Copeland case stand out in the context of a wider Europeanisation of contract law 
is of course the willingness of the Court of Appeals to openly discuss the competing policy 
arguments that colour judicial approaches to failed commercial negotiations. The US courts 
generally have also shown much greater awareness of the role of preliminary agreements and the 
realities behind their drafting. In Feldman v Allegheny International,15 for instance, the Seventh 
Circuit acknowledged the degree of commitment, time and expense involved in hammering out 
complex mergers via letters of intent and memoranda of understanding. In stark contrast, the 
lack of clarity and conviction in the higher English courts when considering both incomplete 
bargains and the impact of evidence from precontractual negotiations speaks volumes. 
Previously, in the leading case of Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society, 
Lord Hoffman was satisfied to note that: 
 
“The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the parties and 
their declarations of subjective intent. They are admissible only in an action for rectification. The 
law makes this distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this respect only, legal 
interpretation differs from the way we would interpret utterances in ordinary life. The 
boundaries of this exception are in some respects unclear. But this is not the occasion on which to 
explore them”.16
 
Lord Hoffman’s ‘restatement’ on the modern interpretation of contracts fails to offer any real 
light as to when negotiations may have consequences in commercial contract disputes. This 
failure to delve deeper into the question of reliance, whilst upholding the exclusion of evidence 
arising from negotiations on the grounds of ‘practical policy’ is clearly unsatisfactory. What is 
clear is that the court can have regard to evidence of negotiations for the purposes of rectification. 
Such cases arise rarely, however, and only in the event that the parties have erred in the drafting 
of an agreement. Here, the aim is merely to bring the written contract into line with the actual 
intention of the parties. Moreover, in addition to this wider judicial non-policy, the law’s 
development in relation to the narrower agreement to negotiate in good faith appears stunted by 
the problematic and one-dimensional template for business negotiations provided by the House 
of Lords in Walford v Miles.17  
 
                                            
14 See A. SCHWARTZ & R.E. SCOTT (2005, p. 46). 
 
15 850 F. 2d 1217 (7th Cir., 1988). 
 
16 [1998] 1 WLR 896.  
 
17 [1992] A.C. 128; [1992] 2 WLR 174. The House of Lords approach has been followed by the Court of Appeal in 
Phillips Petroleum Co. UK Ltd & Ors v Enron Europe Ltd [1997] C.L.C 329. See, however, Petromec Inc. v Petroleo 
Brasiliero SA Petrobas (No. 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 891, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 121 and the contrasting view of 
Longmore LJ in the Court of Appeal that courts should be slow to deem entirely without legal merit an express 
agreement to negotiate in good faith.  
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The by now war torn judgment of Lord Ackner in Walford provides binding authority that the 
agreement to negotiate in good faith is not recognisable under English law. However the decision 
has still been subjected to intense scrutiny and their Lordships apparent aim (to impose stability 
and legal certainty vis-à-vis commercial negotiations) would appear to have rebounded. The facts 
of the case have been well rehearsed in the literature. The dispute concerned a purported ‘lock-
out’ agreement by which the parties had endeavoured to ensure a degree of exclusivity in 
negotiations. The would-be agreement provided that the defendants would not deal with any 
other third party, would in any event terminate negotiations entered into with any third party 
and would ‘continue to negotiate in good faith’.18 As is oft-repeated this reference to a 
requirement to negotiate in good faith provoked the ire of the House of Lords. In his judgment, 
Lord Ackner held that a duty to negotiate was ‘inherently repugnant to the adversarial position 
of the parties involved in the negotiations’19 and, just for good measure, added that it was 
‘unworkable in practice’.20 Lord Ackner reasoned that each party to a negotiation is entitled to 
pursue his own self interest ‘so long as he avoids making misrepresentations’.21
 
Despite the obvious protection afforded against misrepresentation, duress and other forms of 
unconscionable conduct under English law, Giliker and Brown suggest that the current legal 
ambiguity in practice affords parties an opportunity to act in bad faith.22 Of course Lord Nicholls 
has previously called, albeit extra judicially, for a greater admissibility of pre-contractual 
evidence at trial when deciding commercial contract disputes,23 whilst McKendrick suggests that 
                                            
18 For Lord Ackner there were a number of ‘vital’ questions concerning agreements to negotiate that appeared 
difficult to answer, including: 1. how is the vendor ever to know that he is entitled to withdraw from further 
negotiations? and 2. How is the court to police such an ‘agreement?  
 
19 The transcript of the judgment at p.138F reads: ‘A duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice as 
it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party; it is here that the uncertainty lies. In my 
judgment, while negotiations are in existence either party is entitled to withdraw from those negotiations, at any 
time and for any reason’. 
 
20 Though the case has excited much comment, in many respects their Lordships were simply reiterating the view 
of Lord Denning M.R. in Courtney v Fairbairn Ltd v Tolaini Brothers (Hotels) Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 297 that ‘if the law 
does not recognise a contract to enter into a contract (when there is a fundamental term to be agreed) it seems to 
me it cannot recognise a contract to negotiate’, at 301-2. Lord Denning rejected as not well founded dictum in 
Hillas & Co. Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 147 L.T. 503, at 515 that such an agreement, provided it was supported by 
consideration, could be recognised in law.  
 
21 Supra. 
 
22 See respectively, P. GILIKER (2006), SECOLA (2004) and P. GILIKER (2003). The case for an expansion of tort law 
into preliminary dealings in US contract law was long ago explored by GILMORE (1985) and Gilmore’s view that 
bad faith in contract negotiations be classified as a tort rhymes with the vision of the European Court of Justice in 
Tacconi v Heinrich Wagner C-334/00 [2002] ECR I-7357. This author concurs with Brown however, that ‘the 
vagaries of the tortious duty of care are inappropriate as instruments with which to dissect the intricacies of 
commercial negotiations’ in I. BROWN (1992, p. 357). Moreover, as Gardner warns, ‘analysing relationship 
breakdowns in terms of fault is at best a tasteless, and generally inept, undertaking’, see S. GARDNER (2006, p. 
496).  
 
23 My Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of Words (2005) LQR 121.  
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the courts in England and Wales ought progressively to entertain a greater policing of the pre-
contractual bargaining process.24 Yet Giliker has been most forceful in proposing reform and, in  
particular, a greater role for tort. She suggests that the current English position takes no account 
of the protective regime established under EC consumer legislation and allows parties to abuse a 
stronger bargaining position.  
 
The current English position evidently departs from an adversarial view of contract negotiations, 
characterised by parties robust defence of their own best interest, yet recent economic studies 
suggest that a contract law regime that imposes no liability in precontractual settings is sub-
optimal, whilst an overly strict liability based approach is equally inefficient.25 This analysis 
lends significant weight to the intermediate US position promoted in Copeland which allows 
courts to intervene only where one party has induced another into a firm belief that a contract to 
negotiate in good faith exists, or where the parties have themselves contractually agreed to at 
least attempt to amicably hammer out a deal. Moreover, a 2005 report of the International 
Association of Contract and Commercial Managers (IACCM) on business negotiation strategies 
suggests that the English law may currently be offering a view of negotiations that is detrimental 
to parties’ broader commercial interests: 
 
“… The word confrontation has gained an unfortunate connotation. It connotes an abrasive, 
aggressive interpersonal exchange. When solving problems in long-term relationships this is 
never a productive approach. It may have merit in crisis situations, or may even improve an 
individual party’s outcomes in a short-term transactional relationship, but in most of what we 
face in our lives and professions it is a sucker’s choice. A sucker’s choice means that when we 
become aggressive we act on the implicit assumption that we must choose between a better 
outcome and a better relationship. This is a false trade-off. Our research shows it is possible to be 
at once very strong, assertive and effective – at the same time be respectful and considerate of 
others needs and views. The weak negotiator judges that you cannot do both and chooses 
strategies that sub-optimise what is possible”.26  
 
Lord Ackner in Walford took a different view of business efficacy and the proper conduct of 
commercial actors in negotiations. In articulating his mono-ethic view of negotiations his 
Lordship advocated the benefits of an adversarial approach which affords parties the maximum 
freedom to negotiate and the option to threaten melt down ‘in the hope that the opposite party 
may seek to reopen the negotiations by offering … improved terms’.27 It remains equally 
significant that the Channel Home decision that was so influential in Copeland was dismissed as 
‘unhelpful’ by Lord Ackner, whilst other leading US decisions such as the highly influential 
                                            
24 E. MCKENDRICK (2005). 
 
25 See L. ARYE BEBCHUK & O. BEN-SHAHAR (2001).  
 
26 2005 IACCM Report ‘The Role of Confrontation in Contracting and Negotiation Processes’. Available via 
www.iaccm.com. 
 
27 Supra, at 181 F-G. 
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Tribune case (discussed below in part 3) were not raised in submissions. This ‘failing’ on the part 
of counsel arguably gave a slanted view of the general US position on contracts to negotiate. 
 
 
3. Melting Away the Freedom to Negotiate? 
 
The Copeland decision does nonetheless provide an alternative take on a complex theme. It can 
therefore assist debate as to whether or not such a general duty to negotiate in good faith is in the 
wider interest of commercial actors in a European market setting, and if the English law of 
contract should gradually yield to a seemingly more uniform transnational position. Indeed 
Gordley has recently queried whether a future House of Lords may not ‘consider the possibility 
that the rest of the world is right and that Lord Ackner was wrong’.28 Of course, this argument in 
favour of enforcing the contract to bargain in good faith on the basis of majority international 
experience would appear to clash head-on with Michaels’ recent observations on the role of 
functional equivalence in comparative law.29 He suggests that the analysis of similar solutions 
across legal systems may boost our general comparative knowledge and understanding but 
offers little guidance beyond that knowledge and warns that ‘equivalence functionalism provides 
surprisingly limited tools for [subsequent] evaluation’. Michaels seeks to explain this discrepancy 
on the basis that functional equivalence theory implies ‘equal value’ and therefore ‘fails to 
decipher superiority’.30  
 
There is certainly more than an element of truth in Michael’s argument. It further bears repeating 
that the orthodox view at times presents an unduly inflexible vision of the English law of 
contract. Without doubt the courts in England and Wales have placed primary emphasis on the 
need for certainty in contract formation and have felt much more comfortable approaching failed 
ventures and improper conduct in negotiations via specific remedial categories, such as 
misrepresentation, quantum meruit, estoppel and the recognition of implied terms. The courts 
look for evidence of a ‘concluded bargain … which settles everything that is necessary and leaves 
nothing to be settled by the parties’31 yet the courts have also revealed an appreciation that 
‘business men often record the most important agreements in crude and summary fashion’ and 
that ‘it is accordingly the duty of the court to construe such documents fairly and broadly 
without being too astute or subtle in finding defects’.32 The use of entire agreement clauses and 
non-reliance clauses has further provided a typically sensible English commercial drafting 
solution. However, in a similar vein to Bigwood, Collins has previously argued that by setting a 
                                            
28 J. GORDLEY (2005).  
 
29 R. MICHAELS (2006).  
 
30 At p.374. MICHAELS further notes that ‘it is impossible to isolate the function of a legal institution [and by 
extension a legal rule] … and to measure [it] … against some ideal function, for no such ideal function exists. In 
this strict sense, better-law theory is not compatible with functionalist comparative law. 
 
31 Per VISCOUNT DUNEDIN in May & Butcher v R [1934] 2 KB 17, at p.21.  
 
32 The courts may therefore construe a contract to implement the parties’ intentions, provided they do not go so 
far as to construct the agreement for them. See G.H. FRIDMAN (1960).  
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high standard of certainty for finalised contracts, in such a way as to exclude most informal 
agreements, it may still be possible via a generalised duty to better protect legitimate commercial 
expectation.33  
 
Collins and the Californian Appeals court would appear to be on much the same page in 
suggesting that the requirement that parties agree terms with sufficient clarity and precision to be 
enforced need not be sacrificed by a sufficiently coherent overarching protective duty that could 
in effect be triggered by the parties’ own conduct. This call for a generalised duty appears in part 
to be prompted by dissatisfaction with the generally confused state of English law in this area. 
What is abundantly clear is that the stringent tests and rather cumbersome categorisations 
applied under English law to precontractual scenarios do grossly inflate the complexity of the 
law, lending weight to the case for a more generalised duty, or more appropriately a suitably 
coherent doctrine.  
 
 
4. General Principles to the Rescue? 
 
Importantly, Van Houtte has previously suggested that ‘one of the great innovations of the 
UNIDROIT principles is that they provide standards for conducting negotiations’. Modern case 
law and arbitral awards relying on the Principles, or rather the absence thereof, embarrasses Van 
Houtte’s assertion. In the last decade only one reported arbitral award - of the ICC Court of 
Arbitration in Paris - has had any real bearing on precontractual liability under the UNIDROIT 
Principles, and even then merely tangentially.34 The ICC Tribunal was asked to determine 
whether the parties, having agreed to ‘meet promptly and negotiate in good faith’ a number of 
international supply and service contracts, were duly obliged to conclude negotiations in good 
faith.  
 
The parties had failed to make an express choice of law but the contract had a close connection to 
the laws of England (which was also the seat of the arbitration), Saudi Arabia, Georgia, New York 
and New Jersey. Much of the negotiation phase of the deal had taken place in the US, and the 
Defendant urged the Tribunal to reject the application of English or Saudi law which are both 
decidedly cool on the notion of good faith in negotiations. Instead the Defendant stressed that 
such a duty would be enforceable under the laws of Georgia, New York and New Jersey. In the 
alternative the Defendant invited the Tribunal to rely on the UNIDROIT Principles, by virtue of 
which - in the eyes of the Defendant – the ‘express commitment’ of the parties to ‘negotiate in 
good faith is enforceable’.35   
 
                                            
33 H. COLLINS (2003, p. 329 et seq). 
 
34 Source: Unilex case law reserve of the CISG convention and the Unidroit Principles. A summary of the ICC award is 
accessible via http://www.unilex.info/case. 
 
35 Evidence was presented that the choice of applicable law was discussed, if only briefly, during negotiations in 
Georgia in 1993 but no firm decision either way was ultimately reached.  
 11
InDret 3/07  Martin J. Doris 
Relying on the fact that the parties had agreed a prior non-disclosure agreement which contained 
a specific choice of law clause in favour of ‘the law of New York’ the Tribunal had little difficulty 
in extending this express choice to the entire contract.36 The ICC Tribunal further accepted on the 
evidence that the parties had indeed obligated themselves to meet promptly and negotiate in 
good faith and as such determined that ‘the Parties could not have intended that the governing 
law of the contract would render this obligation unenforceable’. In seeking to do justice to the 
parties expressed ‘wish’, the Tribunal seized upon previous New York case law in order to flesh 
out the enforceability of a duty to negotiate in good faith under both New York state law and 
‘general principles of law’.  
 
As in Copeland, the views of Farnsworth would play a significant role in deciding the outcome of 
the dispute. The Tribunal received submissions direct from Farnsworth and ‘other learned 
American jurists’ before ultimately outlining a highly contextualised procedural method for 
dealing with incomplete agreements. It was accepted that the binding nature of such preliminary 
dealings could only be determined via an examination of ‘the circumstances surrounding the 
negotiations of the agreement, the conduct of the parties, and, of course, the terms of the 
agreement, including the number and significance of open terms’. It is notable that the Tribunal 
felt it necessary to consider the treatment of preliminary agreements when determining the duty 
to negotiate in good faith, and the Tribunal adopted enthusiastically the position of Judge Leval 
in Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n v. Tribune Co.37 that: 
 
“Notwithstanding the importance of protecting negotiating parties from involuntary judicially 
imposed contracts, it is equally important that the courts enforce and preserve agreeements that 
were intended as binding, despite a need for further documentation or negotiation. It is of course 
the aim of contract law to gratify, not to defeat, the expectations that arise out of intended 
contractual agreement, despite informality or the need for further proceedings between the 
parties”.  
  
Like a lower District Court, the Tribunal moved to further endorse Judge Leval’s view of the duty 
to negotiate in good faith, which ‘arises often implicitly’. The arbitration panel accepted that the 
                                            
36 ‘We do consider highly relevant, however, the fact that the Non-Disclosure Agreement, which was signed by 
the parties … contains a choice of law clause in favour of the law of New York, including the statement that “the 
parties are familiar with the principles of New York Commercial Law, and desire and agree that the law of New 
York shall apply in any dispute arising with respect to this Agreement.’, at para. 5 of the Award. The Tribunal 
was similarly persuaded by the fact that one of the Parties appeared to be a corporation organised under the laws 
of the State of New York.  
 
37 670 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y, 1987). (the case being referred to by the panel as the ‘Tribune case’). The Tribune case 
itself differentiated between two types of preliminary agreement. In the first type the parties are considered to 
have reached ‘complete agreement (including agreement on the binding nature of their commitment) on all issues 
requiring negotiation. All that remains to be done is for the parties to carry that agreement forward into practice’. 
The second type of preliminary agreement is, according to Judge Leval, one that ‘expresses mutual commitment 
to a contract on agreed major terms, while recognising the existence of open terms that remain to be negotiated. 
Although the existence of open terms generally suggests that a binding agreement has not been reached, that is 
not necessarily so. For the parties can bind themselves to a concededly incomplete agreement in the sense that 
they accept a mutual commitment to negotiate in good faith and to reach final agreement within the scope that 
has been settled in the preliminary agreement’, at 497.  
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obligation does not guarantee that a final contract will necessarily materialise – as the parties may 
simply lose interest as circumstances change – but does require a legitimate attempt to reach a 
deal. Crucially, the panel endorsed the decision in Tribune that the obligation does ‘bar a party 
from renouncing the deal, abandoning the negotiations, or insisting on conditions that do not 
conform to the preliminary agreement’. The ICC panel found such reasoning ‘compelling and 
appropriate’ and further endorsed Professor Farnsworth’s ‘sound interpretation of the pertinent 
articles’ of the UNIDROIT principles. In the event, Farnsworth promoted his consistent view that: 
Plainly, although the Principles impose a duty of good faith on negotiating parties quite apart 
from the agreement, it would be inconsistent with the Principles to hold an agreement to 
negotiate to be unenforceable.38
 
Yet despite the endorsement of the UNIDROIT Principles and the view of the ICC arbitrators that 
‘international arbitrators are fully justified to turn to general principles of law’, this case concerns 
not the role of the Principles as such, but rather the role of New York state law. Advocates of the 
UNIDROIT Principles will argue that the case reveals how the Principles accord with wider 
international practice but that view is open to an alternative interpretation. The high degree of 
uncertainty as to the applicable law – with four competing legal systems connected to the case – 
revealed a truly opportune occasion when retreat to ‘general principles of international law’ 
ought reasonably to have afforded the panel with an appropriate, less costly remedy. The 
decision dramatically highlights the absence of meaningful case law applicable to preliminary 
agreements and precontractual duties under the UNIDROIT Principles themselves. Rather 
alarmingly, unless New York State law, or similar domestic case law decisions affirming broad 
duties to negotiate in good faith, are to become a proxy surrogate for the Principles, it is clear that 
the UNIDROIT Principles will continue to offer greater uncertainty than coherence in seeking to 
regulate international commercial negotiations and incomplete bargains. Far from an 
independent source of ready-made commercial rules, the ICC decision reveals greater support for 
the view that the interpretation of the UNIDROIT Principles is ever dependent upon domestic 
court decisions.39  
 
Of course such a state of dependency will not trouble those of Schödermeier’s persuasion. He 
suggests that, ‘… there is trust in international practice, but it is controlled and verified according 
                                            
38 The Tribunal added that ‘… the undertaking to negotiate in good faith … would thus be valid, binding and 
enforceable under general principles of law as reflected in the UNIDROIT Principles’. This orthodox view that 
where parties have agreed to negotiate in good faith, then the parties should be held to such a commitment is a 
typically Farnsworthian analysis (See also E.A. FARNSWORTH (1987) “There is no adequate reason to refuse to give 
effect to the explicit intention of the parties to an agreement to negotiate”). The freedom to ‘contract’ argument is 
not clinching however, given the uncertainty attached to the duration of any such ‘contractual’ commitment. It is 
equally problematic under the UNIDROIT Principles as the Principles are not exactly comprehensive as to what 
constitutes good faith during negotiations.  
 
39 This view is not supported by M. SUCHANKOVA (1997) who argues that the Principles provide ‘clear and 
accessible rules which assure predictability for those that refer to them’. Curiously, she similarly acknowledges 
that ‘judges and arbitrators have reasons to hesitate before applying them’. A fact borne out by the ICC Arbitral 
award examined above. See also J. PAULSSON (1990, p. 96) who argued at that time that the degree of divergence 
across national systems prevents a satisfactory arrival at ‘normes transnationales sur le comportement 
précontractuel’. 
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to our own fundamental legal values. Domestic laws can hardly be denied this influence’.40 
Similarly, Klaus Peter Berger, who acknowledges that the UNIDROIT Principles and other soft 
law initiatives are mere ‘comparative snapshots’ sees this domestic dependence as an 
opportunity rather than an obstacle for the development of national rules, and recommends that 
domestic judges and international arbitrator’s should consistently strive toward the 
‘internationally useful’ interpretation of contract in the light of ‘transnational commercial law’.41 
Berger argues that, ‘In transborder trade and commerce this will be a solution which is sensible 
under the economic circumstances of the case’ and adds controversially that, ‘if the parties have 
included a choice of law clause in their contract it can be assumed that they will accept a certain 
margin of possible decisions based on this law’. Why any such assumption can be reached is not 
revealed, however Berger is convinced that within his ‘natural margin’ a judge or arbitrator may 
endeavour to find an ‘internationally useful method of construction’ which finds a solution that 
accounts for ‘the particularities of international trade and the economic interests of the parties’. 
On a first reading there is a certain attraction underlying Berger’s would-be ‘new global law via 
renewed domestic law’ approach, yet it is at best a defence of the role of soft law principles in 
domestic courts. It is by no means a recipe for enhanced legal certainty and predictability in the 
practical application of those soft law Principles.  
 
Where the UNIDROIT Principles appear equally imprecise and therefore problematic is in 
relation to the calculation of reliance damages. Much of the current imprecision may in part be 
due to an attempt to reach a mid-point between traditional common and civil law positions. The 
Principles do make clear that damages for breach of precontractual duties are to be assessed on 
the basis of ‘loss caused’, and aim to recompense parties’ out-of-pocket expenses and any lost 
opportunity or loss of a chance to contract with a third party.42 However, it is equally notable 
that the Principles remain silent about the contractual or tortious foundation of liability, the 
implication being that good faith alone will provide the procedural sticking plaster. Criticism can 
therefore be levied at the Principles dependence upon the breadth and vagueness of good faith in 
trying to regulate in turn precontractual information, loyalty and general protective duties. With 
the CFR now conceded, and the research strategy proceeding to the apparent satisfaction of 
Clapham Omnibus commuters, can an appropriate uniform approach to incomplete agreements 
                                            
40 M. SCHÖDERMEIER (1989). 
 
41 K.P. BERGER (2002). 
  
42 Article 2.16 UPICC further enshrines a broad duty of confidentiality. Any improper use or disclosure of 
confidential information may result in an award in damages. Berger has recently added that, ‘Even in purely 
domestic cases, German doctrine looks at the approach of ‘modern lawmakers’ such as the Lando Commission 
and the UNIDROIT Working Group. For example, it is an open question in German legal doctrine whether pre-
contractual liability in case of breach of a duty of confidentiality involves a duty to pay compensation based on 
the benefit received by the party in breach’. He concurs with Canaris that, in order to resolve this question 
German doctrine should look at Art. 2.16 of the UPICC for guidance. Citing CANARIS in J. BASEDOW, J. (ed) (2000) 
he agrees that ‘the step [to accept a duty to pay compensation based on the benefit received] would find strong 
support in Art. 2.16(2) UPICC. This would increase substantially the weight of this argument and would tip the 
balance in favour of such an approach, given that German legal doctrine is undecided and open on this issue. 
This would apply in particular if Art. 2.16 (2) UPICC is grounded on a broad comparative basis and does not 
result from a more or less isolated idea of its drafters’. See also, G. FORBIN (1998). 
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and the question of reliance be forged? The remit of the CFR would appear to prevent it. Equally, 
such a development will require a move beyond ‘comparative snapshots’ and general clauses. 
 
 
5. Bargaining and Reliance Revisited 
 
Despite Gordley’s suggestion of apparent international uniformity in this area, English contract 
law is not alone, as evidenced by a growing concern expressed in US, Australian and European 
civil law opinion at the prevailing theoretical disorder caused by failed bargains and the spectre 
of reliance. In addition to a suitable judicial method for handling such partial contracts, the need 
to ‘relocate’ precontractual liability from somewhere between the shadowlands of contract and 
tort is a universal challenge. Those compiling the CFR are doubtless sensitive to the need to 
ensure that such claims occupy a satisfactory place in any wider Community law of obligations, 
despite the limitations imposed by the scope of the Common Frame research program. 
Echebarría Sáenz has discussed the need for a ‘tertium genus’ or third legal doctrine lying 
somewhere between contractual and extra-contractual liability in order to better explain and 
rationalise judicial interference in bargaining;43 and particularly illustrative of this enduring 
concern is the recent doctrinal ‘handbags’ between Randy E. Barnett and Charles Knapp over the 
reliance interest in the US, and the use and abuse of promissory estoppel under section 90.  
 
Knapp suggests that those of Barnett’s persuasion are simply ‘academic Felix Ungers’, whose 
‘compulsive [doctrinal] tidiness’ and desire for ‘doctrinal purity’ and ‘neat ordering’ effectively 
blinds their vision to the ‘uses to which lawyering Oscar Madisons of the real world may put 
[doctrines such as section 90 in practice].44 However, Barnett is right not to be indifferent about 
the distinction – a distinction that seeks to preserve the doctrine of freedom of contract – for it is 
not merely a question energising doctrinal nutcases and that smacks of a ‘first-year-law-school 
mentality’.45 Barnett is correct in highlighting the need for doctrinal clarity and consistency, 
particularly in removing the question of reliance from the contract/tort divide. Barnett has since 
retaliated by warning that there is a danger for private litigants if the ‘loaded gun’ of section 90 is 
left ‘lying casually around for some judicial Oscar Madison to pick up and misuse’.46 Whilst 
Grant Gilmore was a rather lousy fortune-teller and the doctrinal wall that separates contract 
from tort law in the US has not collapsed, it has been badly dented. What is odd, however, is that 
                                            
43 ECHEBARRIA SAENZ (1995, p. 226 et seq). (who is also critical of the dependence in Spanish legal theory on the 
‘breadth’ of the good faith doctrine in trying to regulate a raft of varying precontractual duties).  
 
44 C. KNAPP (1998). KNAPP is not enthused by the contract/tort debate in relation to promissory estoppel. He 
suggests that ‘people make promises, people break promises, other people get hurt. Is this tort? Is this contract? 
As KARL LLEWELLYN once pungently remarked, “What the hell”, at 1244.  
 
45 Supra, at 1211.  
 
46 R.E. BARNETT (2001). And see previously R.E. BARNETT (1996). Importantly, the impact of reliance concerns on 
legal taxonomies has been more widely addressed in the US than in Europe. See, inter alia, R. COOTER (1985); R. 
CRASWELL (1996). Of course, Friedmann rejects much of the terminology used in relation to reliance claims and is 
praiseworthy of the English approach (‘In American legal literature the use of the unfortunate term ‘expectation’ 
interest persists. However, in other jurisdictions there are some signs that the more appropriate terminology that 
speaks of the ‘performance interest’ is gaining ground’). See D. FRIEDMANN (2001).  
 15
InDret 3/07  Martin J. Doris 
Barnett has rather uncritically passed over Holmes’ observation that promissory estoppel is an 
equitable form of relief that ‘sits on its own bottom’47 – an analysis that has gained most ground 
in the Australian courts and that appears to provide a more satisfactory and less problematic 
basis for justifying reliance claims in the wider law of obligations. As is highlighted below, recent 
developments do expose the fact that Knapp’s entertaining, if rather lame academic cheap-shots 
are plainly wrong and Barnett is right to worry about the correct location of reliance claims, 
simply because the terminology and taxonomy questions have proved just as problematic, if not 
more so, in practice than arriving at a satisfactory justification for the instrumentalist goal of 
protecting reliance.  
 
Intriguingly, added to this mix, in late 2006 McFarlane – relying heavily on recent US and 
Australian doctrine – makes a rather bold statement in arguing that English law, ‘… in the 
doctrine of proprietary estoppel … possesses a tool uniquely well-qualified to deal with the 
problem of pre-contractual reliance’.48 McFarlane neatly identifies the three primary problems 
caused by the current English law approach as ‘coverage’ (the law may on occasion fail to 
provide a claim to deserving parties), ‘clarity’ (judicial decisions lack transparency and 
predictability) and ‘coherence’. In fairness to McFarlane, his analysis does not seek to engage 
with the wider harmonisation debate, however such a welcome reforming attitude does still 
appear somewhat shortsighted in the context of European integration.  
 
Whilst the use of estoppel to explain the basis of recovery for precontractual reliance under 
English law has been floated previously,49 it would still face a number of obstacles in a European 
context, aswell as under current English law. The promotion of a Community estoppel remedy, 
whether promissory as in the US or equitable as in Australia, would likely give rise to adjustment 
problems for all European jurisdictions. Even the very term ‘estoppel’ itself would not transplant 
easily beyond common law systems, and it would be perhaps unwise to inflict on civil lawyers 
the same discomfort with the meaning and applicability of good faith that arises in common law 
circles – even if an estoppel approach could win support on the grounds that it is transnational in 
spirit. Being rooted in equity, estoppel does have an advantage in that it conjures up similar 
equitable concerns to those raised in civil law systems via good faith. Indeed, Hesselink has 
encouraged the view that the ‘content’ of modern good faith doctrines ‘could be regarded as a 
new ius honorarium or as civil law’s equity’.50 However, plumping for a proprietary estoppel 
                                            
47 E. HOLMES (1996). What is notable in the last decade of debate in the US is that, bar the work of Farnsworth and 
Knapp, discussion of reliance and promissory estoppel has typically occurred outside of the leading US journals. 
It is only relatively recently, and mainly via law and economics scholarship, that the arguments are returning to 
the contract mainstream.  
 
48 B. MCFARLANE, (2006).  
 
49 See GOFF & JONES (1998, p. 673) (promoting equitable estoppel as the basis for a restitutionary claim and noting 
that ‘The restitutionary claim conceals a claim for reliance loss, where no claim for damages for breach of contract 
can lie’). 
 
50 See M. HESSELINK (2004, p. 493). Though a little dated, Hesselink cites Maitland on Equity (1949) who suggests 
that common lawyers: ‘… ought to think of equity as a supplementary law … you ought to take the many 
equitable modifications of the law of contract, not as part of equity, but as a part, and a very important part, of 
our modern English law of contract’, at p.21.  
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approach for English law is at the very least terminologically awkward when considered against 
the backdrop of Europeanisation.  
 
The primary advantage offered by an alternative, new European detrimental reliance doctrine 
would be that it would be terminology-neutral and could perhaps be better tailored – through 
appropriate drafting and application – in order to be much tighter in its scope than the open-
ended notions of both good faith and fair dealing and estoppel – doctrines that have been further 
weakened both by their complexity and over-usage. The term estoppel has always been the 
source of much confusion under English law and would doubtless prove contentious in new 
European private law. Moreover, whilst the Australian law of estoppel has undergone a 
wholesale, if still incomplete, transformation, this new direction has not been assimilated, let 
alone adequately analysed. In part, the complexity of the Australian doctrine and its rather 
confused application in relation to contract bargains means that it is not easily covered within 
standard works on either contract, equity or property law. Instead fractures of the doctrine 
appear and are treated rather loosely and haphazardly. Moreover, the scope of the Australian 
equitable estoppel doctrine is itself unsettled and remains still very much contested. As a newly 
emergent doctrine it remains ‘in a state of flux’.51  
 
A new Community reliance doctrine should nonetheless aim to learn from and build on recent 
Australian experience whilst avoiding in its future application the ‘doctrinal Krazy Glue’ of 
promissory estoppel, as operated previously in the US.52 Johnston has previously argued that the 
common law rules regarding contract formation are ‘so formalistic that parties will often 
reasonably rely on a promise and yet not receive any remedy at all because they relied before a 
contract had been legally created’.53 He suggests that this is ‘the problem addressed by the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel and section 90 of the Restatement’. Certainly this is the problem 
that the rule seeks to address – it just does so in a problematic manner, given the sheer breadth of 
section 90.54 Nonetheless, Johnston’s argument holds – the aim of the courts is essentially to 
protect detrimental reliance. Applying a similar world-view to Johnson, the aim of a new EC 
reliance doctrine should be ‘merely’ to validate limited incursion into private bargaining, 
principally in order to restore reliance expenditure to A in situations where A has acted to his 
detriment on a reasonably held belief or view, inspired by or attributable to B, that a contract 
                                            
51 Per Kirby P in PS Chellaram & Co. Ltd v China Ocean Shipping Co Ltd (1991) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 493, at p.502.  
 
52 Per Knapp, who whilst advocating reliance damages notes that previously ‘… expressions of commitment, 
which under the bargain theory could usually be freely repudiated for lack of consideration, became binding 
obligations with the doctrinal Krazy Glue of promissory estoppel’, supra at 1223. 
 
53 J.S. JOHNSTON (2004). 
 
54 Linzer who was tasked with preparing much of the Commentary on Section 90 has since revealed that he based 
his observations almost exclusively on the ‘fact-specific’ Hoffman v Red Owl case and acknowledges today that the 
case had less to do with reliance on a promise than ‘reliance on a relationship’, a bargaining relationship that 
simply progressively unravelled over time, see P. LINZER (2001, p. 719). 
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would materialise. That detriment, as Pratt observes, consists ‘in the costs incurred by the reliant 
party that are rendered ineffectual by the desertion of the assumption that led to the reliance’.55  
 
It must be accepted that there is a risk of failure built into all negotiations. As such, limiting 
recovery to out-of-pocket expenses under a new EC contract law would not only respond well to 
the real law in action but would encourage parties to better allocate the risks of failure between 
them. Saunders who has similarly explored the degree of deep judicial confusion surrounding 
incomplete agreements in the US adopts the same position. He notes a number of sound reasons 
for limiting bad-faith breach in negotiations to out-of-pocket expenses, including above all the 
relative ease of calculating any such loss.56  
 
 
6. Taking Walford v Miles Seriously – Contracts to Bargain (in Good Faith) and the 
Sustainability of the English Position 
 
Although in Walford Lord Ackner gave short shrift to the then US approach, key lessons can be 
drawn from both recent Californian and European civil law experience which might be suitable 
for a future European contract law? The primary legal objection to the contract to bargain under 
English law relates to the fact that pure reliance on a promise would fail as a substitute for 
consideration. This argument is made most forcefully by Norisada, Poole and Furmston in 
rejecting the notion.57 The spectre of reliance has also been seen as a threat to the liberal 
negotiation of commercial contracts. However, as Brown notes, ‘whilst it cannot be said that a 
majority of legal systems have wholeheartedly adopted the contract to negotiate in good faith, 
many have an awareness of the problems engendered by such undertakings and do not consider 
good faith doctrines to be alien to commercial law’.58 A raft of recent US court decisions which 
have sought to protect precontractual reliance have been founded upon an ‘implied offer’. As 
Brown notes, ‘extrapolating from this idea and using conventional contract terminology, it may 
be possible to evaluate the extent of the parties’ resolution and commitment to securing a 
completed contract’.59 As negotiations will vary dramatically from exploratory beginnings to the 
gradual culmination in a firm offer, an implied offer may lack sufficient precision to constitute an 
actual offer but it may still ‘induce substantial reliance in the other party that is worthy of 
protection’: 
 
“… it may be that the offer need not be definitive, provided that it provokes the reliance at the 
outset, attention then shifting and focusing upon the extent of the reliance. Levels of 
determination and earnestness vary in contracts to negotiate but the parties’ negotiations can 
                                            
55 M.G. PRATT (2000). 
 
56 J. SAUNDERS (2006).  
 
57 See M. FURMSTON, T. NORISADA, T. & J. POOLE (2001).  
 
58 Supra, at p.394-5.  
 
59 At p.365. 
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have reached such an advanced stage that an implied offer exists as a clear manifestation of 
intent such that only minor technicalities or the formal execution of a document are envisaged as 
preceding the offeree’s actual acceptance”. 
  
It is further suggested that parties’ reliance will be at its peak immediately prior to the contract’s 
completion. Perversely, as Buckley observes, it is typically at this point in negotiations when 
negotiating may be at its most adversarial and antagonistic as the parties endeavour to grind out 
the best possible deal.60 Brown considers that a failure to proceed with a largely complete 
agreement should be construed as a clear breach of the contract to negotiate contrary to good 
faith and submits that ‘this deployment of reliance achieves the objective mentioned earlier, that 
is to devise notions of good faith which function in adversarial bargaining and harmonise with 
the laissez-faire axioms of contract’. It is indeed arguable that this level of commitment was 
reached in Walford as there were no longer any remaining disputed terms and nothing 
substantive left to agree. Brown correctly identifies that ‘within the principle of good faith 
negotiations it is consequently implicit that reasonable reliance has its counterpart in acceptable 
risk’:  
 
“A plaintiff must establish that he has crossed the threshold of risk to the extent that his reliance 
upon the defendant’s acts or representations is justifiable. Good faith thus defined utilises the 
recognisable legal tools of promise, inducement, risk and reliance. Moreover, this analysis 
accords with a (modified) theory of freedom of contract in that it allows for a consideration of 
self-reliance”.  
 
Brown argues that whereas tort law reconfigured could play a similar role, he suggests that good 
faith ‘as an implied term’ presents itself as a more appropriate tool that could be ‘tied to the 
particular obligations created by the negotiations’. Such an approach it is argued:  
 
“… shuns an ethereal moral principle premised upon fair dealing or honesty in commercial 
negotiations for it is the fear and suspicion of vacuous delineations of good faith or 
unconscionability which lead to their complete rejection. In estoppel, fiduciary obligations and 
economic duress, for example, English law has shown its ability to proscribe unfairness in 
commercial dealings. In establishing a duty of good faith in pre-contractual negotiations, its 
future task must be to take an objectively-defined middle-ground between the polar regimes of 
indefinable unconscionability and untenable deceit. A scheme for enforcing the subsidiary 
contract to negotiate may therefore be envisaged”. 
 
A middle-ground position clearly promoted in Copeland. This author shares the view of Brown 
that it is indeed regrettable that the House of Lords saw fit to confirm that a contract to negotiate 
is ‘a thing writ in water’. Brown rightly observes that the common law possesses ‘sufficient 
ingenuity to recognise novel claims and adapt settled rules in order to ascertain or imply 
contractual liability, some recent cases showing a judicial inclination to investigate new avenues 
                                            
60 See R.P. BUCKLEY (2001).  
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of thought”.61 To date, lower courts have been required to follow Walford faithfully, merely 
tweaking the decision at the corners. It is nonetheless surprising how little impact the subsequent 
decision in Allied Maples Group Limited v Simmons & Simmons,62 has had on the question of 
interpretation of negotiations in the English courts. Perhaps, the case has been undervalued as it 
related to a case in negligence against a solicitor. Allied sued for the loss of a chance to negotiate a 
protective clause into a contract, following their solicitor’s negligent advice during the drafting 
process (Allied were advised to delete a specific warranty that subsequently proved necessary). It 
was argued and accepted on appeal that Allied would merely have to show a substantial chance 
that it would have been successful in negotiating protection. Crucially, Hobhouse L.J. observed 
that: 
 
“Where parties are engaged in negotiations on the detailed terms of a commercial deal upon 
which they are both agreed in principle and from which both are expecting to gain, it is in no way 
unrealistic to conclude that meaningful negotiations are possible within the framework of the 
deal when a difficulty of this kind arises ... Negotiations may depend upon the will of the parties 
and neither party was under any obligation at that stage to agree anything. But it is unrealistic to 
treat the outcome of further negotiation between commercial parties as arbitrary and wholly 
unpredictable. Those with experience of commercial negotiation are able, with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy, to form a view of what can be achieved by such negotiation”. 
 
That said, cases such as Copeland and Walford are marginal cases that arise at the extremes. These 
head-ache cases are not an easy fit within the classical rules of contract, nor easily resolved with 
satisfaction on the grounds of equity and/or good faith. For this reason, the inclusion of a broad, 
generalised principle of good faith applicable to negotiations under the CFR should be resisted. 
Introducing such a principio-norma as a further legal ‘catch-all’ would not remove the current 
confused array of rules and remedies applying to the precontractual regime, nor would it provide 
any greater consistency for dealing with hard cases. To those systems for whom the doctrine is 
supposedly ‘repugnant’, it would contribute little more than confusion and ‘irritation’. The old 
piecemeal forms of protection would not easily give way to this new principle of good faith in 
negotiations, leaving a deeply cluttered European commercial contract law whilst weakening 
much of the consistency and rigidity that English contract law has prized so dearly. What is 
required is less practical and doctrinal complexity and, by contrast with what we have at present, 
the operation of a detrimental reliance doctrine that is limited to recovery of parties’ out-of-
pocket expenses.  
 
It can of course be argued that judicial decisions concerning preliminary agreements and 
resultant reliance are so varied that they simply defy capture. Argument in favour of enforcing 
the contract to bargain is further open to criticism from those such as Michaels. This author may 
well be ‘guilty’ of a form of applicative functional equivalence yet the logic for upholding an 
express bargain to negotiate (and indeed the ‘workability’ of the notion in practice, even in 
                                            
61 Supra. 
 
62 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1602.  
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English legal practice) flows both from comparative analysis and practical experience. With civil 
courts in England and Wales increasingly promoting the advantages of ADR and mediation, 
particularly post-Dunnet v Railtrack63, Lord Ackner’s opposition to anything other than 
adversarial bargaining offers a shortsighted view of commercial negotiations that ignores 
alternative constructive styles of bargaining - a feature of modern business that at other times and 
in other settings, the courts of England and Wales have clearly had little difficulty upholding.  
Despite Lord Ackner’s well-worn dicta in Walford, the case of AT&T v Saudi Cable64 reveals that 
English lawyers have little practical difficulty policing an agreement to negotiate in good faith. 
The arbitration panel in London was able to determine that a party failed to negotiate properly 
and punish that failure with an award in damages. Support for the contract to bargain, despite 
lending much needed certainty to the English law of contract post-Walford, can further be 
defended as a reinforcement of parties’ bargaining freedom. Even where parties fail to express a 
definitive time-period for further negotiations in ‘good faith’, the gap-filling approach promoted 
in the Spanish civil courts is justifiable where parties have indicated a preference for a less 
adversarial style of negotiations and should be followed by the courts in England and Wales, and 
in any new agreed EC contract law.65
 
As for the question of ‘superiority’, few comparative law (or indeed law and economics) studies 
have been undertaken in Europe to test the validity and/or utility of differing approaches to 
precontractual liability across jurisdictions, much less the ‘superior’ regime. Of the small number 
of economic studies that have addressed the optimal level of interference in contract bargaining, 
the majority have been US based.66 However, aswell as glimmers of new thinking in relation to 
the critical importance of contract drafting, there are increasing signs of new European law and 
economics scholarship considering the uniformity goal.67 Further analysis may ultimately prove 
modest but such research allied to empirical enquiry must become the fuel of harmonisation.  
 
Finally, beyond the narrower contract to bargain, a modern, coherent doctrine aimed at 
protecting reliance investment appears equally necessary in emerging European markets. It is 
submitted that a detrimental reliance doctrine, geared towards a ‘light’ regulation of commercial 
bargaining, may provide a suitable alternative to the existing national patchwork of rules and 
                                            
63 [2002] 2 All ER 850. (In which Railtrack Plc were heavily penalised in costs by the Court of Appeal for refusing 
to consider mediation, despite the parties being locked in ‘without prejudice’ negotiations). See also the 
Australian decision in Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 996 where parties were obliged to 
maintain an ‘open-mind’ in further negotiations, and to properly consider proposals, even if they were not 
compelled to find a definitive agreement.  
 
64 [2000] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 625.  
 
65 The Spanish Supreme Court has recently considered Lord Ackner’s uncertainty problem ‘solved’. In an earlier 
judgment of 5 October 1996 the Court made reference to Article 1.118(2) of the Civil code. Despite the infelicities 
in its drafting, the provision does provide a sensible gap filling option in allowing a court to determine a time 
period for further negotiations as that which would most likely have been agreed by the parties, having regard to the 
type of contract under negotiation.  
 
66 Including most recently, B. MEDINA & O. Grosskopf (2006).  
 
67 J. ALFARO ÁGUILA-REAL (2007), and more concretely, F. GÓMEZ POMAR (2007) (who advocates a mimimum 
regulation of B2B contracts at Community level) Both articles are accessible via Indret.com.  
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confused concepts. As evidenced by the work of the Network for Uniform Terminology for European 
Private Law, in addition to taxonomy, terminology remains critical. From the perspective of pure 
legal phraseology, a detrimental reliance doctrine is infinitely superior to the cumbersome and 
outdated common law ‘estoppel’ and ‘quantum meruit’ doctrines and the civil law’s ‘culpa en 
contrahendo’, even if a constrained detrimental reliance doctrine may provide relief in many of 
the same ways that the current doctrines operate today. McFarlane has promoted a new 
‘proprietary estoppel’ doctrine for the English law, however it seems preferable to work more 
universally towards an agreed European doctrine and in this regard ‘detrimental reliance’ 
presents itself as an attractive counter-proposal, again even if many of the doctrine’s 
characteristics will overlap neatly with McFarlane’s approach. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
This call for a new Community reliance doctrine may appear at odds with broader trends in the 
US, and an identifiable judicial retreat from promissory estoppel relief. Macaulay’s article in 1991 
on The Reliance Interest and the World Outside the Law Schools’ Doors68 has not been as influential as 
many of his other contributions but would appear to mark the point of retreat from broad 
reliance claims in the US courts, particularly following the golden age of reliance from Red Owl 
through to the landmark Texaco Inc judgment. Though virtually impossible to guage, it would 
certainly be worth exploring the extent to which familiarity in US business circles with the threat 
of reliance damages has gradually rendered the promissory estoppel doctrine both less 
contentious and much less necessary in practice. Commercial actors in the US are also arguably 
confronted with significantly less obstacles when agreeing on negotiation positions and general 
drafting and, as such, sunk costs are likely to be proportionality higher in cross border 
negotiations in Europe by comparison.  
 
Though the tension between freedom of contract and detrimental reliance will endure – as if it 
could ever not, provided a clear demarcation line remains between an enforceable bargain and a 
busted deal, the integrity of European contract law should remain. In England and Wales, 
‘restitution lawyers have been meticulous in ensuring that the law of contract is not undermined 
by restitutionary recovery’.69 A similar care and circumspection will be necessary at Community 
level to avoid a Gilmorean ‘death’ of European contract law before it even took shape. Arguably, 
a single coherent doctrine applicable to both procedural and substantive expectations, and 
suitably fashioned on the basis of international experience, could gradually provide the necessary 
consistency.  
 
Recent US court decisions such as Copeland reveal high uncertainty and strong divergence in the 
treatment of incomplete agreements across State lines, particularly as to when parties can safely 
retreat from negotiations. The willingness in the US to temper the severity of the rules on 
                                            
68 As Friedman observes, supra, the main thrust of modern US law has been in the very opposite direction, 
notwithstanding the terminological impact of Fuller and Perdue’s The Reliance Interest.  
 
69 See D. NOLAN (1996, p. 605).  
 22
InDret 3/07  Martin J. Doris 
formation with theories of reliance means that an evaluation of good faith is largely a 
prerequisite. On both sides of the Atlantic, however, the courts appear ill-equipped generally to 
deal with reliance based claims flowing from failed negotiations and partial agreements. As an 
area of contracting practice the world of failed deals has nonetheless been hopelessly under-
examined in European scholarship. The lack of enforcement of existing rules on precontractual 
liability in the US and European civil courts further betrays a degree of judicial discontent and 
pinpoints a clear lack of synchronisation between decomposing academic law ‘on the books’ and 
the realities of the court room.  
  
Beyond immediate substantive (consumer) contract law considerations at Community level, for 
those intent on fostering greater uniformity in the field of precontractual liability, and who seek 
to nudge the English courts towards a seemingly more transnational view, removing Lord 
Hoffman’s procedural obstacle to evidence of negotiations is arguably a necessary first step. In 
2006, the Court of Appeal in Proforce Recruit Ltd v The Rugby Group Ltd stressed that ‘although the 
Investors principles have been applied or quoted in countless High Court and Court of Appeal 
cases, the principles are not always consistent with the reasonable expectations of the contractual 
parties’.70 There can be little doubt that the breadth of the exclusionary rule will on occasion 
disguise real evidence of bad faith in negotiations. Arguably, through the careful use of case 
management, particularly summary judgment as in the US and sanctions in costs, it ought to be 
possible to maintain sufficient order for the current rule to be gradually relaxed, even if the high 
cost of commercial litigation in England continues to cast a long shadow. With European 
business dominated by little people, such as Copeland, and less so by giants such as Baskin 
Robbins, the economic case for law reform and greater uniformity merits particular scrutiny 
under the CFR. Whether it can receive such attention only the next phase of the Common Frame 
project can reveal. 
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